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Citizen Led Policing in the Digital Realm: Paedophile
Hunters and Article 8 in the case of Sutherland v Her
Majesty’s Advocate
Allison M.Holmes∗
In Sutherland v Her Majesty’s Advocate, the Supreme Court unanimously dismissed an appeal
which argued that the use of communications obtained by a paedophile hunter group as ev-
idence in criminal prosecution was a violation of Article 8 of the European Convention on
Human Rights. The case raises fundamental questions of the scope of the right to private life as
regards to the content of communications and the role played by private actors in the criminal
justice process. This note argues that by limiting the protection of Article 8 to private commu-
nications which satisfy a contents-based test, the Court has bypassed the Article 8(2) balancing
test to the detriment of the due process rights of the accused. The note concludes that the de-
cision opens up the prospect of the state circumventing the accused’s Article 8 privacy rights by
lending tacit approval to the proactive investigations of these private ‘paedophile hunter’ groups.
INTRODUCTION
Groom Resisters Scotland describe themselves as an ‘online child protection
enforcement team’.They are just one of the so-called paedophile hunter groups
who are engaged in activities aimed at identifying and ultimately convicting
individuals involved in interpersonal child-oriented sexual offences.1 Operat-
ing outside of the legislative framework for covert activity which binds tra-
ditional police authorities, these groups represent a shift toward citizen-led
policing in the digital sphere. The techniques utilised by the groups vary, but
typically involve online interactions coupled with real-world contact. Fre-
quently, this involves adult decoys purporting to be children online in order to
lure those who aim to groom and exploit children. Once these individuals are
identified, the paedophile hunter groups arrange meetings to confront them,of-
ten filming and publicising these encounters. The evidence obtained through
∗Lecturer in Law, Kent Law School, University of Kent. The author would like to thank Dermot
Walsh, Steve Crawford, and the anonymous referees for their useful feedback and suggestions.
1 L. Brooks, ‘Scotland’s child abuse activists: We embrace the vigilante label’ The Guardian
6 Aug 2019 at https://www.theguardian.com/society/2019/aug/06/scotlands-child-abuse-
activists-we-embrace-the-vigilante-label (last visited 10 September 2020). Interpersonal child
sexual offences are defined as offences where an individual targets sexual communications at
a minor in an online environment. These communications include: the description of explicit
sexual behaviours and scenarios, discussions of a sexual nature, and incitements to minors to en-
gage in sexual behaviour.See M.Yar, ‘The policing of Internet sex offences:pluralised governance
versus hierarchies of standing’ (2013) 23 Policing and Society 482, 483.
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Citizen Led Policing in the Digital Realm
these ‘sting’ operations is shared with the police for the purposes of criminal
prosecution.
This conduct formed the basis of the submissions in Sutherland vHer Majesty’s
Advocate (Scotland)2 (Sutherland). The appellant was charged with multiple of-
fences related to sexually motivated communications with a child contrary to
the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009 and the Protection of Children and the
Prevention of Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2005.3 These charges emanated
from contact with an adult member of Groom Resisters Scotland, posing as a
13-year-old boy on the website Grindr. The appellant was informed through-
out the exchanges, both on Grindr and subsequently on WhatsApp, that the
recipient of the communications was underage. Copies of the appellant’s com-
munications were provided to the police and formed the basis of the evidence
utilised against him. It was within this context that the Court was asked to con-
sider two issues: first, whether Article 8 rights may be interfered with by the
use of the type of communications between the appellant and the paedophile
hunter group as evidence for the prosecution; and second, the extent to which
the state’s obligation to provide adequate protection for Article 8 is incompat-
ible with the use by a public prosecutor of this material.4
In ultimately deciding these questions in the negative, the judgment limits
the scope of Article 8(1) on the basis of the content of the communications
and the conduct of the individual involved. Drawing on extant jurisprudence,
the Court considered that the conduct and nature of the communications were
such that no reasonable expectation of privacy could be afforded. Focusing on
the content of the communications in the evaluation of the applicability of
Article 8(1), the reasoning of the Court imposes an additional barrier to the
right to private life.The case also raises wider policy issues.The judgment con-
centrates on balancing the interest in the right to private life of the appellant
against that of the potential victim, omitting discussion of the role played by
these private organisations. This case raises questions of lateral surveillance and
the horizontal effect of privacy protections between individuals. The decision
reinforces a two-tiered system of liability for interferences with the right to
private life which precludes conduct which would be classed as a violation
when undertaken by the state being classed as an interference when under-
taken by a private organisation. By failing to acknowledge the implications of
the activities of the paedophile hunter groups on privacy, the court lends tacit
acceptance to the activities of these groups and provides a route through which
2 Sutherland v Her Majesty’s Advocate (Scotland) [2020] UKSC 32.
3 The charges were attempting to cause an older child to look at a sexual image under the Sexual
Offences (Scotland) Act 2009, s 33; attempting to communicate indecently with an older child
under the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009, s 34; and an offence of attempting to meet with
a child for the purposes of engaging in unlawful sexual activity under the Protection of Children
and the Prevention of Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2005, s 1.
4 n 2 above at [11].
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communications may be interfered with and used for policing purposes in the
absence of legal safeguards.
THE PATH TO THE SUPREME COURT
The case of Sutherland concerns a series of communications which took place
between the appellant and a decoy from 18 January 2018 to 31 January 2018.
During this period, the appellant initiated contact with the decoy and sent
sexually explicit content to an individual whom he believed to be aged 13.
The appellant asked the decoy to delete the communications and to move the
conversation to WhatsApp, which the decoy agreed to do.5 On 31 January,
a meeting was arranged. At this meeting, members of the paedophile hunter
group met the appellant and filmed and live broadcasted the encounter on social
media.6 It was during this encounter that the police were called and extracts of
the communications shared with the authorities.One the basis of this evidence,
the appellant was indicted on the charges at Glasgow Sheriff Court.
In the initial proceedings, the appellant challenged the admissibility of the
evidence on two bases.He first alleged that the evidence had been obtained by
covert means without the necessary authorisation required under the Regula-
tion of Investigatory Powers (Scotland) Act 2000.7 Second, he alleged that the
evidence should be deemed inadmissible as it was obtained in violation of his
Article 8 rights.
Both of these arguments were rejected by the Sheriff. Mr Sutherland then
appealed to the High Court of Justiciary.On 20 September 2019 these appeals
were refused. However, he was granted permission to appeal to the Supreme
Court in relation to certain compatibility issues pursuant to section 288AA of
the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.8
The compatibility issues on which the court was asked to rule are:
1. Whether, in respect of the type of communications used by the appel-
lant and the paedophile hunter group,Article 8 rights may be interfered
with by their use as evidence in a public prosecution of the appellant.
2. The extent to which the obligation on states to provide adequate pro-
tection for Article 8 rights is incompatible with the use by a public
prosecutor of the material supplied by the paedophile hunter groups in
investigating and prosecuting crime.9
5 ibid at [15].
6 ibid at [13].
7 Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Scotland) Act (RIPSA), 2000 s 7.
8 Under Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, s 288AA the powers of the Supreme Court are
exercisable only for the purposes of determining the compatibility issue. This section, read in
conjunction with s 288AZ of the same Act defines a compatibility issue as a question arising in
criminal proceedings, as to whether a public authority has acted in a way which is made unlawful
by the Human Rights Act 1998, s 6(1).
9 n 2 above at [11].
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SUTHERLAND IN THE SUPREME COURT
Article 8 – the right to respect for private and family life
The submissions on behalf of Sutherland concerned Article 8. Article 8 is a
qualified right. It may be interfered with in certain circumstances. The right
provides as follows:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in
a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or
the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of
the rights and freedoms of others.
Was there an interference with Article 8(1)?
In deciding the first issue in the negative, the court examined two criteria,
namely, the nature of the communications and the reasonable expectation of
privacy on the part of the applicant.
The Nature of the Communications
It was in their assessment of the nature of the communications that the court un-
dertook a balancing exercise, weighing the requirements to protect the privacy
of the applicant against the potential interference with the right to private life
of the child. Particular attention was given to the fact that the communications
at issue concerned purely private citizens rather than any state authorities. Lord
Sales,with whom the other judges of the court concurred,observed that absent
any question of state surveillance or interception, the reprehensible nature of
the conduct in engaging in such communications was sufficient to negate any
protection under Article 8(1).10 Drawing on the reasoning of Baroness Hale in
Countryside Alliance and Ors v Her Majesty’s Attorney General, Lord Sales recog-
nised that Article 8 is not an unqualified right; rather, acts done in private may
still fall outside the scope of the article when they so drastically conflict with
the values inherent in the ECHR.11
This conclusion was based on three core considerations. The first related
to the nature of the conduct in question, namely that between a paedophile
and a child. That such conduct is criminal in nature is irrefutable. However, it
was not that the conduct amounted to criminal activity, but rather the nature
of the criminal activity itself that precluded it from Article 8 protection. The
fact that the potential victim is a child demonstrates the serious nature of the
10 ibid at [40].
11 ibid at [27];Countryside Alliance and Ors vHer Majesty’s Attorney General [2007] UKHL 52 at [116].
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offence, indicating it is one of greater immediacy and of greater potential dam-
age.12 The potential victim was further emphasised in the second consideration
which looks to the positive obligation owed by the state to children to enforce
criminal law.13 Drawing on the reasoning in the case of R v G the court noted
that the ECHR requires the state to provide priority to the rights of the child
over any interest that the paedophile could claim.14 Finally, the court considered
the Article 17 prohibition of the abuse of rights.The domestic implementation
of this article requires that nothing in the Convention be interpreted as per-
mitting those activities which are aimed at destroying the rights and freedoms
of others.15 The actions by the appellant were aimed at the destruction of the
rights of the child. In concluding their reasoning, the court emphasised that the
positive obligations of the state to protect the child outweighed any legitimate
interest the appellant could have under Article 8(1).16
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
When assessing whether or not there has been an interference with an individ-
ual’s communications in a way that amounts to a breach of the right to private
life, the court will have regard to whether there is a reasonable expectation
of privacy in those communications. Lord Nicholls in Campbell v MGN Ltd
(Campbell) noted that ‘the touchstone of private life is whether in respect of
the disclosed facts the person in question had a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy’.17 The Supreme Court confirmed this standard in the subsequent case
of In re J38. In that case Lord Toulson writing for the majority held that this
reasonable expectation test is an objective one to be applied broadly, taking into
account all the circumstances of the case.18 As such the individual’s reasonable
expectation of privacy can be ascertained from a range of factors.
In the case of Sutherland, Lord Sales considered that the contents of the com-
munication and the relationship between the sender and recipient negated any
reasonable expectation of privacy. The communications were intended for a
child of 13 with whom the appellant had no prior relationship. The court rea-
soned that the request by the appellant to keep the communications confidential
were insufficient to create an expectation of privacy.19 In this regard, Lord Sales
linked the reasonable expectation of privacy to the nature of the communica-
tions, noting that these communications were not ‘an aspect of correspondence
which was worthy of respect’, precluding the communications from further
protections.20 Notably,Lord Sales recognised that there may be a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy were the communications subject to police surveillance or
12 n 2 above at [41].
13 ibid at [42].
14 ibid;R v G [2008] UKHL 37 at [54].
15 Human Rights Act 1998, Sched 1.
16 n 2 above at [43].
17 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22 at [21].
18 In re JR38 [2015] UKSC 42 at [98].
19 n 2 above at [56].
20 ibid at [40].
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intrusion by the wider public.21 However, given the circumstances surrounding
the communication, the court concluded that there was no interference with
the appellant’s rights under Article 8(1).22
The state’s positive obligation to protect Article 8
Having found that there was no interference in the right to private life, the
Court went on to examine the extent to which the state’s positive obligation
to protect Article 8 rights was inconsistent with the use of evidence provided
by paedophile hunter groups. Following the precedent established in Ribalda
v Spain, the court held that positive obligations only arise where Article 8 is
applicable in the first place.23 As the first issue had been answered in the negative,
this obligation did not arise in the current context.
THE STRASBOURG POSITION
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has consistently maintained
that ‘the right to private life is a broad term and not susceptible to exhaustive
definition’.24 Inherent in this right is respect for correspondence which the
court has noted is not qualified by any adjective such as that which precedes
‘life’.25 The protections for correspondence under the article are not limited to
those communications sent in private.26 The Strasbourg Court has interpreted
communications to cover a wide range of activities, from telephone calls,27 to
email,28 to instant messaging.29 In the instant case the messages sent by the
appellant through the web platforms fall within the ambit of correspondence.
The appellant’s claim revolves around the sharing of that correspondence by
the recipient with the state authorities. In this regard it is important to note
that the ECtHR jurisprudence recognises the protections for correspondence
are not limited to interferences by the state. This point is articulated in the case
of Von Hannover v Germany (Von Hannover), where the Court held that
[w]hile the essential object of Article 8 is to protect the individual against arbitrary
interference by the public authorities, it does not merely compel the State to ab-
stain from such interference: in addition to this negative undertaking, there may
be positive obligations inherent in effective respect for private or family life. These
21 ibid at [58].
22 ibid at [63].
23 ibid at [66]; See also Ribalda and Ors v Spain [2019] ECHR 752.
24 See Bărbulescu v Romania [2017] ECHR 754 (Bărbulescu) at [70];Benedik v Slovenia [2018] ECHR
363 at [100].
25 Bărbulescu ibid at [72].
26 See Niemietz v Germany [1992] ECHR 80 at [29];Halford v United Kingdom [1997] ECHR 32 at
[44];Copland v United Kingdom [2007] ECHR 253 (Copland) at [41].
27 See Klass v Germany [1978] ECHR 4 at [41];Zakharov v Russia [2015] ECHR 1065 at [173].
28 Copland n 26 above at [41].
29 Bărbulescu n 24 above at [74].
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obligations may involve the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for
private life even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves.30
The extent to which the state is under a positive obligation under Article 8
must be considered with regard to the context and the need to strike a fair
balance between competing interests. In determining this balance, the state will
be given a wider margin of appreciation where the interests at stake relate to
the effective deterrence of criminal acts which impact on aspects of private
life.31 The Court has considered how to balance the competing claims to the
right to private life by individuals where criminal conduct is at issue. Extant
precedent requires that, where private life is at stake, children and vulnerable
individuals are in particular entitled to effective protection and the state is under
a positive obligation to ensure those rights.32 The Strasbourg Court has held
that this positive obligation may require the effective criminalisation of acts such
as those at issue in the current case.33 In so doing, the state must act in a way
which ‘respects the due process and other guarantees which legitimately place
restraints on criminal investigations and bringing offenders to justice, including
the guarantees contained in Article 8’.34 The utilisation of evidence provided
by paedophile hunter groups calls into question the ability of the state to ensure
that those fundamental values of due process are met.
Where a positive obligation exists on the state to balance the right to private
life of children against other individuals through effective criminal law provi-
sions, the ECtHR has held that the mere fact that the conduct of the individual
was reprehensible does not in itself negate the Article 8 interest of the perpe-
trator. This position was set out in the case of KU v Finland, wherein the court
qualified its position, holding that the balancing act is ‘without prejudice to the
question of whether the conduct of the person … can attract the protection
of Articles 8 and 10, having regard to its reprehensible nature’.35 Aware of this
qualification, the Supreme Court distinguished the facts of Sutherland. Central
to this was the idea of the potential harm and the type of protection required.
Whereas in the case of KU v Finland the harm was indirect, here the conduct
was direct, giving rise to a more serious risk of harm.36
The Supreme Court emphasised the potential harm that could be caused to
the child required a positive obligation be placed on the police to take action
based on the information provided.37 This reasoning implies that a determining
30 Von Hannover v Germany [2005] ECHR 555 at [98].
31 MC v Bulgaria [2003] ECHR 651 (MC) at [150];X and Y v The Netherlands [1985] ECHR 4 at
[27].
32 MC ibid at [150].
33 KU v Finland [2008] ECHR 1563 at [42]-[43].
34 n 2 above at [48].
35 ibid at [49].
36 The case of KU v Finland concerned an unidentified person placing an advertisement on an
Internet dating site in the name of a 12-year-old child, providing details as to his age and a
physical description.The applicant became aware of the advertisement when contacted by a man
offering to meet him. The service provider, regarding itself as bound by confidentiality, refused
to divulge the identity of the person who posted the ad. There was no explicit legal provision in
domestic law which would permit an order of disclosure. See n 33 above at [49]-[50].
37 n 2 above at [50].
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factor in the application of Article 8(1) is the level of harm risked to others
by upholding the private life interest of the individuals engaged in criminal
conduct.
Furthermore, the Court drew on the idea that there exists a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy within the communication, linking this to the nature of
the communication. The position in the UK courts is that the consideration
of whether there is a reasonable expectation is fundamental to determining
whether the right to private life is engaged.38 This interpretation is somewhat
at odds with the Strasbourg Court. The ECtHR has examined the issue on
several occasions and maintained the position that ‘a reasonable expectation of
privacy is a significant though not necessarily conclusive factor’.39 The court
in Sutherland distinguishes the present case from the previous ECtHR ruling
in Benedik v Slovenia (Benedik) which concerned an adult convicted of offences
relating to the possession and distribution of pornographic content involving
minors.40 The applicant in Benedik similarly alleged an interference with his
Article 8 rights. In finding that the applicant’s Article 8(1) rights were engaged,
the court recognised that from the applicant’s subjective perspective, the un-
derstanding was that the activity would remain private and that the question
was ‘whether he could have reasonably expected privacy’ in conduct where he
presumed his identity was private.41
For the court in Sutherland, the focus in dismissing this element of the ar-
gument was rooted in the idea that the purported recipient was thought to
be a child and their communications did not establish a relationship of confi-
dentiality.42 This fails to fully consider the reasoning of Benedik and the wider
elements which may contribute to an expectation on the part of the applicant
that the communications are private. The above discussion indicates that while
the reasonable expectation of privacy is a contributory factor in determining
whether there has been an interference, it is not the sole factor. The following
discussion will examine the wider implications of the decision of Sutherland as
it relates to the application of the right to private life.
DISCUSSION
The decision in Sutherland emphasises that the content of the communication
itself is a determining factor as to whether it engages a privacy interest, with
certain elements identified as negating any privacy considerations. In the case
of Sutherland, these elements focused on the nature of the conduct and the po-
tential recipient. It is submitted that a better interpretation would be to weigh
those elements in determining whether the interference was justified under
Article 8(2). Such an approach would follow the line of reasoning set out in
38 n 17 above at [21].
39 Garamukanwa v United Kingdom [2019] ECHR 445 at [22];Bărbulescu n 24 above at [73];Benedik
n 24 above at [101].
40 Benedik ibid at [14].
41 ibid at [116].
42 n 2 above at [56].
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Campbell which emphasised that the content of the communications does not
normally indicate whether they would benefit from an expectation of privacy;
rather such elements are relevant to a consideration as to whether the alleged
conduct was proportionate to the interference with the right to private life.43
In designating the content of a communication as an element to be consid-
ered in determining whether a right to privacy was engaged, the Court has
circumscribed the interpretation of Article 8(1), making the right contingent
on the ‘respectability’ of the communication. This runs counter to the general
interpretation in the ECtHR case law that the content of correspondence is
not relevant to the question of whether there has been an interference.Relying
on balancing the Article 8 rights of the potential victim against those of the
appellant based on the nature of the communications allows the privacy con-
siderations of criminal suspects to be easily dismissed. It raises the risk that these
private conversations will be denied the protections under Article 8 without the
benefit of the balancing exercise envisaged by Article 8(2). This can preclude
any proper assessment of whether the actions of the private actors constitute
a disproportionate encroachment on core rule of law values in the criminal
process. Similarly, it will obviate a proper assessment of whether the state’s re-
liance on the evidence provided by these actors constitutes a disproportionate
interference with the accused’s due process rights.
While the court’s reasoning on the nature of the communications represents
a departure from the Strasbourg case law, the interpretation of the reasonable
expectation of privacy appears to follow existing precedent, albeit with some
omissions. The academic literature and case law have accepted that there is no
universal definition of what a reasonable expectation of privacy may entail.44
In Sutherland the court drew on the fact that the victim was a purported child
and there was an absence of a longstanding relationship to indicate that an ex-
pectation of confidentiality may exist.45 Other factors may be relevant to the
consideration of whether an expectation exists. Notable in the case of Suther-
land was the choice of platform; WhatsApp is a messaging platform which is
protected by end-to-end encryption. End-to-end encryption is a secure means
of communicating in which third parties are prevented from intercepting or
accessing the data while in transit.While the recipients are aware of the sender,
the use of a secure messaging platform indicates that the appellant may have an
expectation of privacy in their correspondence.
This reasoning was evident in the case of BC and others v Chief Constable of
the Police Service of Scotland where the Court of Session considered the expecta-
tion of privacy for correspondence sent via WhatsApp. In the initial judgment,
Lord Bannatyne considered the characteristics of WhatsApp in contrast with
43 n 17 above at [21]-[22].
44 J.Rule, ‘“Needs” for surveillance and the movement to protect privacy’ in K.Ball,K.D.Haggerty
and D. Lyon(eds), Routledge Handbook of Surveillance Studies (London: Routledge 2012) 66; R.L.
McArthur, ‘Reasonable Expectations of Privacy’ (2001) 3 Ethics and Information Technology 123,
126; P. De Hert, ‘Balancing Security and Liberty Within the European Human Rights Frame-
work: A Critical Reading of the Court’s Case Law in the Light of Surveillance and Criminal
Law Enforcement Strategies After 9/11’ (2005) 1 Utrecht L Rev 68, 76.
45 n 2 above at [49].
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other social media platforms.46 In his reasoning, he noted the characteristics
of the platform, holding that these indicated that ‘an ordinary member of the
public using such could have a reasonable expectation of privacy’.47 On appeal
the determination of whether a member of the public using WhatsApp could
have a reasonable expectation of privacy was not subject to challenge.48 As such
the position regarding communications sent via these secure platforms remains
unclear. It is submitted that the choice of platform could be an element for
consideration in determining whether the individual had a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy. Such an interpretation would be in line with the reasoning
in Delfi AS v Estonia and Benedik v Slovenia which addressed the expectation
of confidentiality and anonymity on online platforms in light of the right to
private life under Article 8.49
An issue of wider significance raised by the case is the blurring of the public-
private divide as it relates to the use of privately obtained evidence for criminal
prosecutions.While focused on the subsequent use of the material derived by
paedophile hunter groups, this case raises questions about the actions of the
groups themselves and the potential privacy interferences they commit. The
activities of these groups occur across the United Kingdom and have been
a consistent phenomenon for years.50 These groups occupy a distinct space,
wherein they are both seen as independent of traditional law enforcement yet
reliant on those policing mechanisms to achieve their stated goals.They depend
on the digital sphere and interactions for their success, engaging in ‘proactive’
policing methods where they seek out targets online and confront them in real
space. It is the interaction between their digital activities and the legitimate state
actions that makes these groups effective.51
These methods have met with some success, with Police Scotland recognis-
ing that the activities of these groups accounted for 55 per cent of all recorded
grooming cases in the 2018–19 fiscal year.52 Yet these groups pose a unique
risk to individuals’ fundamental rights. Unregulated and unchecked, they use
the moral outrage generated by the activities of paedophiles to gain support for
their activities.As the National Police Chiefs’Council notes, ‘[p]ublic discourse
focuses upon tackling child abuse as a positive and marginalises wider consid-
eration of the deleterious effects of these groups’.53 The tactics of these groups
can pose a threat to the right to private life of the individuals they target.
While the case of Sutherland addressed the potential implications on private
life by the subsequent use of material derived from these groups in criminal
prosecutions, it is worth exploring the potential implications for private life by
46 BC and Others v Chief Constable of the Police Service Scotland and Ors [2020] CSOH 48 at [137].
47 ibid at [150].
48 BC and Others v Chief Constable of the police Service Scotland and Ors [2020] CHIS 61 at [87].
49 Delfi AS v Estonia [2015] ECHR 586 at [148];Benedik n 24 above at [105].
50 NPCC, ‘Responding to Online Child Abuse Activists’ (Chief Constables’Council, 11 July 2018)
para 2.3.
51 K. Hadjimatheou, ‘Citizen-led digital policing and democratic norms: The case of self-styled
paedophile hunters’ (2019) Criminology & Criminal Justice 1, 12.
52 HMICS, Strategic review of Police Scotland’s response to online child sexual abuse (February 2020) para
248.
53 NPCC, n 50 above, para 2.1.
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the activities of these groups themselves. As the Strasbourg courts have estab-
lished, the right to private life may be engaged between individuals.54 The activ-
ities of these groups in using covert methods, meeting, confronting, recording,
and sometimes detaining suspects in real space can trigger questions of the in-
terference with the right to private life by their actions. In particular, the covert
nature of their activities which aim to identify suspects and collect evidence for
the purposes of prosecution represent a shift towards citizen led surveillance of
private communications and activities which raises questions about the positive
obligations on the state to prevent such interferences.
In this regard, it is lamentable that the court did not consider the practices
of the paedophile hunter groups and the appellant’s claims concerning covert
human intelligence practices. The appellant alleged that the actions of the pae-
dophile hunter group were such that the provisions of the Regulation of In-
vestigatory Powers (Scotland) Act should apply.55 This argument was dismissed
by the Court, holding that the decoy acted on his own initiative and not at the
instigation of the police. The decoy therefore did not fall under the definition
of a covert human intelligence source (CHIS) which would require authorisa-
tion.56 Yet this interpretation fails to take into consideration key developments
between these groups and their relationship with the police. The National Po-
lice Chiefs’ Council has recognised that the activism of these groups continues
unabated, with more than 100 incidents each month.57 Police Scotland have
noted that the number of crimes reported by these groups ‘make it difficult
to argue against their contribution’.58 These groups bill themselves as fulfilling
a policing and enforcement role, with Groom Resisters Scotland, the group
at issue in Sutherland, declaring themselves to be an ‘online child protection
enforcement team’.59 They view themselves as occupying the liminal space be-
tween vigilantism and law enforcement. The primary aim of these groups is to
collect incriminating evidence and engage in covert surveillance methods of
intended targets.60
With the increasing prevalence of these groups and adoption of their evi-
dence, further consideration is needed as to whether these groups are in fact
acting as covert sources.The domestic interpretation to date is that such conduct
will not fall under the classification of CHIS activity if the police do not ‘use or
conduct’ the paedophile hunter groups in their activities.61 This follows from
the general interpretation of the RIPA provisions that vigilante activity is nor-
mally outside their scope. However, the Code of Practice for CHIS indicates
that this interpretation is highly context dependent. Several factors may lend
54 Köpke v Germany [2010] ECHR 1725 at [42];Von Hannover n 30 above at [57];KU v Finland n
33 above at [42]-[43].
55 n 2 above at [18].
56 Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Scotland) Act 2000, s 7(5).
57 n 53 above.
58 n 52 above, para 249.
59 ‘GroomResisters Scotland’Facebook at https://www.facebook.com/GroomResistersOfficial (last
accessed 12 October 2020).
60 J. Purshouse, ‘“Paedophile Hunters”, Criminal Procedure, and Fundamental Human Rights’
(2020) J L & Soc’y 1, 14.
61 R vWalters; R v Ali T2016262 and T20160897 Crown Court at Newcastle, unreported.
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themselves to the determination that the paedophile hunter group is actually
acting in a CHIS role. For example, the Crown Prosecution Service has identi-
fied the frequency of the provision of information to the police as an element
which may result in CHIS protections.62 In the period from mid-October 2017
to the end of March 2019, one group allegedly undertook 80 sting operations
for which they provided evidence to the relevant authorities.63 This indicates
that there is a frequent interaction between the group and provision of relevant
materials which lends support to the argument that it should be considered un-
der the CHIS framework. Furthermore, the CHIS Code of Practice notes that
an authorisation should be considered, ‘for example, where a public authority
is aware that a third party is independently maintaining a relationship in order to
obtain evidence of criminal activity, and the public authority intends to make
use of that material for its own investigative purposes’.64 If police are aware
that these groups are, on their own initiative, undertaking covert activities to
provide the police with evidence, even in the absence of police direction, then
these groups should be interpreted as falling under this provision.
Similarly, if any guidance or instruction is issued by the police in undertak-
ing the activities, that may give rise to the allegation that the activity falls under
the scope of covert human intelligence activity. Evidence from academic litera-
ture and reports on the paedophile hunter groups states that they often receive
informal encouragement and advice from the police forces with whom they
interact.65 The Strasbourg case law indicates that if such support is provided,
the activities should be imputable to the police, thereby engaging the responsi-
bility of the state under Article 8.66 Police guidance on interactions with these
groups notes that the current policies are inconsistent across forces.67 While
there is disquiet amongst senior police officials in the activities of these groups,
the benefit of their work has been recognised.This leads to concerns that there
is an implicit approval of the activities of these groups.
62 ‘Online Child Abuse Activist Groups on the internet’ Crown Prosecution Service, 23 July 2020
at https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/online-child-abuse-activist-groups-internet (last ac-
cessed 21 October 2020).
63 Brooks, n 1 above.
64 Home Office,Covert Human Intelligence Sources Revised Code of Practice (August 2018) para 2.26.
65 See E. Campbell, ‘Policing paedophilia: Assembling bodies, spaces and things’ (2016) 12 Crime,
Media, and Culture 345, 349; A. Gillespie, ‘“Paedophile Hunters”: How should the law re-
spond?’ (2019) 12 Crim L R 1016, 1019; Yar, n 1 above, 490; Hadjimatheou, n 51 above,
8; Purshouse, n 60 above, 13. For news reports see K. Sandeman, ‘Why Nottinghamshire
Police could strengthen links with paedophile hunters’ Nottingham Post 9 October 2018
at https://www.nottinghampost.com/news/nottingham-news/nottinghamshire-police-could-
strengthen-links-2090840 (last accessed 2 November 2020); L. Brooks, ‘Scottish Prosecutors
in “in cahoots with paedophile hunters”, court told’ The Guardian Scotland 3 June 2020
at https://www.theguardian.com/society/2020/jun/03/scottish-prosecutors-in-cahoots-with-
paedophile-hunters-supreme-court-told (last accessed 2 November 2020); ‘Paedophile hunter
behind PH Balance reveals how he is bringing perverts to justice’ South Wales Argus 3
July 2018 at https://www.southwalesargus.co.uk/news/16329129.paedophile-hunter-behind-
ph-balance-reveals-bringing-perverts-justice/ (last accessed 4 November 2020).
66 MM v Netherlands [2003] ECHR 153 at [36-39].
67 NPCC, ‘Responding to Online Child Abuse Activist’ (16 Jan 2019) para 4.1.
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CONCLUSION
The case of Sutherland has expanded the opportunity for excluding the content
of criminal correspondence from the protections of Article 8. In so doing, it
focuses on assessing the nature of the communication; holding that the repre-
hensible nature of the communications negates any protections enshrined by
the right to private life. Such an interpretation requires the balancing exer-
cise, normally left to the determination of whether an interference was justified
under Article 8(2), to be considered in ascertaining whether the right is even
engaged. This limitation on the application of Article 8(1) is even more signif-
icant given the means by which the correspondence was obtained and used in
subsequent proceedings. The role of private actors in performing investigative
functions traditionally left to law enforcement allows them to undertake acts
which pose a risk to the right to private life of their targets. In failing to recog-
nise these groups as acting in a covert human intelligence capacity, an area is
created wherein the right to private life is potentially interfered with, but there
is no legal recourse. Accepting the evidence provided by private actors who
view themselves as fulfilling a public duty creates a gap in the protections for
individuals who may be caught by these activities. By accepting the legitimacy
of the evidence used in the case of Sutherland, the methods adopted by these
groups are given implicit approval.
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